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Abstract
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has 
generally lacked the security incidents 
common throughout the country since 
2003. Yet, tension between the main polit-
ical parties ruling over the region – the 
Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) and the Sulaimani-based Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – has increas-
ingly come to the surface. What explains 
these increasingly overt signs of volatility? 
The post-2003 political order in the KRI is 
built upon a two-party patronage system 
that undercuts any meaningful institu-
tionalisation of a joint administrative 
and security system. Public employment, 
access to government contracts, and posi-
tions in security forces are mediated by 
party-controlled channels. Troublingly, 
the potential for conflict arises when one 
party impedes on the capacity of the other 
to maintain its patronage networks. Expec-
tations that the current dip in oil prices 
will encourage political reforms are likely 
misplaced. Analysts have too often under-
stood Iraqi Kurdistan through the lens of 
oil-based rentierism, despite the fact that 
previous dips in oil prices have never sub-
stantively diminished the capacity of the 
parties to maintain patronage networks. 
In the absence of sustained pressure from 
the public or international community, the 
political order will continue to rest upon a 
two-party patronage system, leaving the 
region vulnerable to instability. 
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Executive Summary
After years of conflict and a civil war during the 1990s, the post-2003 settlement enshrined 
an era of shared governance in Iraqi Kurdistan, with each of the two major Kurdish politi-
cal parties agreeing to collaborate in a joint regional government. In the years that followed 
the invasion, the political formula appeared to work, and the region was often lauded for 
its development and stability. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) formed unity governments and even went so far as to cam-
paign jointly in elections. But recently the arrangement has showed signs of fissures. In 
April 2020, for the first time since the end of the civil war in 1998, the Kurdish region wit-
nessed a military standoff between peshmerga forces controlled by the PUK and the KDP. 
This report contends that the sources of this volatility are not new. The post-2003 polit-
ical order in Iraqi Kurdistan is built upon a two-party patronage system that undercuts 
any meaningful institutionalisation of a joint administrative and security system. Public 
employment, access to government contracts, and positions in security forces are medi-
ated by party-controlled channels. Because of the extensiveness of the KDP and PUK’s 
patronage networks, the region is unified only in name. In unpacking the structure of this 
patronage system, the paper makes the following arguments:
(1) Patronage and the potential for conflict are tied together
Rather than reinforcing loyalty to the regional government, networks of patronage in 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) are tightly organised around the two main parties 
and their respective subregions. The potential for conflict arises when one party 
impedes on the capacity of the other to maintain its patronage networks. The civil war 
in the 1990s emerged over disputes related to revenues at the border crossings. Such 
disputes are far from over. Recent tensions between the two parties have emerged over 
the control of oil and gas fields, in addition to allocations of the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) administrative budget.
(2) Patronage is a totalising system, encompassing the public and private sectors
It is almost impossible to obtain a senior post in the KRG outside the party apparatus 
of either the KDP or the PUK. The private sector is equally embedded within the party 
system. It is extremely difficult for any large business to operate without direct part-
nerships with party companies and proxies. 
(3) The Kurdish security apparatus is a major source of party-based patronage
To date, the routes of entry into the security forces – and particularly the officer ranks 
– are mediated through party channels. The Ministry of Peshmerga distributes salaries 
to the PUK and the KDP forces based on numbers and lists provided by local com-
manders. This reporting system grants the commanders, and therefore the parties, 
with enormous leverage over their fighters. 
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(4) The drop in oil prices will not necessarily threaten party-based patronage
Analysts have too often understood Iraqi Kurdistan through the lens of oil-based rent-
ierism, despite the fact that previous dips in oil prices have never succeeded in shifting 
the structural dominance of party-based patronage in the region. Not only are funding 
streams diverse beyond oil (e.g., border crossings, party-owned companies and deals, 
etc.), obedience to the party-dominated order is strictly enforced. Both parties’ net-
works and structures of patronage are decades old, forcefully administered, and 
well-equipped to absorb economic shocks. KRI residents know that ultimately the 
KDP and PUK are the only game in town in terms of access to jobs and resources. 
(5) The international community has the most leverage over the Kurdish parties 
due to decades of consistent financial and diplomatic support
The international community should encourage transparency in key financial and 
resource institutions, particularly the ministries of finance and natural resources. 
Similarly, introducing robust independent oversight at the KRG-controlled border 
crossings and other key points of state revenue generation would improve public 
confidence in government. Moreover, it is time for the US, UK, Germany and France 
to apply greater pressure on the PUK/KDP to loosen financial and tactical control 
over the peshmerga as well as the security forces controlled by the Ministry of Inte-
rior, introducing a comprehensive package of reforms that eliminate party-controlled 
approvals of new recruits and meaningfully place both recruitment and operational 
command under the KRG Ministries of Peshmerga and Interior.
Introduction
Between 2005 and 2014, it was not uncommon to read headlines about the Kurdish region 
that lauded its development and stability. At the height of sectarian warfare in Baghdad 
(2006–7), Erbil and Sulaimani were said to be in the midst of a renaissance,1 successfully 
putting the legacy of the Kurdish civil war behind them in favour of a shared future. In 2006, 
the two ruling parties – the KDP and PUK – entered into a power-sharing agreement that 
appeared to place the region under a mostly coherent governing system, seemingly solid-
ifying a commitment to cooperation after the turbulent conflicts and violence between 
the two parties in the 1990s.2 And indeed, it would be hard to deny that the Kurdish region 
has witnessed a notable development of infrastructure, foreign investment, and services 
between 2003 and the present.3 
1   Soner Cagaptay, Audrey Flake and Michael Knights, ‘The Future of the Iraqi Kurds’, Washington Insti-
tute/Policy Focus 85 (July 2008). Available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/
pubs/PolicyFocus85v2.pdf; Bob Simon, ‘Kurdistan: The Other Iraq’, CBS 60 Minutes, 5 August 2007. 
Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/16/60minutes/main2486679.shtml
2   Klaas Glenewinkel, ‘Unification of the administration in Kurdistan Region’, Niqash, 18 January 2006. 
Available at https://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/1115/
3   Johannes Jude, ‘Contesting Borders? The formation of Iraqi Kurdistan’s de facto state’, International 
Affairs vol.93, no.4 (2017), p. 854. 
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And yet, the stubborn persistence of destabilising tension between the two main Kurdish 
parties and their respective territorial zones has increasingly come to the surface. In the 
decade after the 2003 invasion, the leadership of the two parties strove to keep fierce 
disagreements over the revenue sharing and administration out of public view. However, 
this veneer of unity started to break down with the declining health of the PUK’s Jalal 
Talabani starting in 2012, exacerbating existing disagreements within the PUK around the 
party’s approach to the KDP. Following the Kurdish independence referendum in October 
2017, the KDP publicly labelled elements within the PUK as traitors and has effectively 
attempted to minimise PUK representation across the KRG administration.45 While the 
intensity of the rhetoric has since cooled somewhat, the new PUK co-presidency has yet 
to meet with KDP leadership due to the acute ongoing disputes between the two sides. In 
recent months during the COVID-19 pandemic, risks of military confrontations between 
KDP and PUK peshmerga units have reached a breaking point,6 with claims of encroach-
ments onto each other’s traditional territory.
What explains this double-edged dynamic of overall stability at the level of security inci-
dents coupled with stubborn persistence of fierce inter-party conflict and tension? The 
existing literature has emphasised the stability side, attributing the KRG’s relative security 
and development to the ideological coherence and ethnic homogeneity of Iraqi Kurdish 
society,7 external incentives and support in the form of diplomatic and financial assis-
tance,8 and perhaps most crucially, the steady flow of oil revenues, which has enabled 
4   ‘What Do the PUK and the KDP say to each other on October 16?’, Sbeiy.com, 16 October 2018. Available 
at https://www.sbeiy.com/Details.aspx?jimare=9666
5   Rizgar Ali, ‘Deterioration in the relation between the PUK and the KDP has delayed appointing a 
new governor for Kirkuk’, Awene.com, 25 September 2019. Available at http://www.awene.com/detail?ar-
ticle=13470; ‘The current governor of Kirkuk deepens the disputes between the KDP and the PUK’, Nrttv.
com, 22 May 2019. Available at https://www.nrttv.com/News.aspx?id=16408&MapID=1
6   Karwan Faidhi Dri, ‘What is behind the armed Kurdish party standoff in Zini Warte?’, Rudaw, 24 April 
2020. Available at https://www.rudaw.net/english/analysis/21042020 
7   See for instance David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Iden-
tity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 183–222; Mohammed M. A. Ahmed, Iraqi Kurds 
and Nation-Building (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: The 
Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 
11–35; Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub-
lishers, 2012); David Romano, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan: Challenges of autonomy in the wake of US withdrawal’, 
International Affairs vol. 86, no. 6 (2010); Gareth Stansfield and Liam Anderson, ‘Kurds in Iraq: The 
Struggle Between Baghdad And Erbil’, Middle East Policy vol. XVI, no. 1 (2009); Brendan O’Leary, John 
MacGarry, and Khaled Salih (eds), The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq (Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl-
vania Press, 2005); Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future Of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, 
or Division? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 155–85; International Crisis Group, ‘War in Iraq: 
What’s Next For the Kurds?’, Middle East Report no. 10 (19 March 2003). Available at https://d2071an-
dvip0wj.cloudfront.net/10-war-in-iraq-what-s-next-for-the-kurds.pdf; and Denise Natali, ‘The Kurdish 
Quasi-State: Leveraging Political Limbo’, The Washington Quarterly vol. 38, no. 1 (2015).
8   Jude, ‘Contesting Borders?’; Nicole F. Watts, ‘Democracy and Self-determination in the Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq’, in David Romano and Mehmet Gurses (eds), Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in 
the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 141–71. 
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the government to operate as a quasi-rentier state with vast patronage networks.9 In what 
follows, it is argued that the two-party structure of this patronage system – which previ-
ous studies have ignored – is the key to understanding both the presence of stability and 
potential for conflict in the Kurdistan region. 
In previous scholarly discussions of rentierism and patronage in Kurdistan, the emphasis 
in the literature on the primary source of current revenue and resources (i.e., oil pro-
duction) sidesteps the more central question of the mechanisms and systems through 
which that revenue is distributed, as well as the additional funding sources beyond oil. 
Despite the existence of joint administrative institutions and discourses of Kurdish unity, 
networks of patronage are tightly organised around the two parties and their respective 
subregions, with the KDP cultivating loyalties in Erbil and Dohuk and the PUK doing the 
same in Sulaimani, Halabja and Garmian. Both parties have also cultivated loyalties in the 
disputed territories.10 Due to this bifurcated structure of patronage, population buy-in and 
political stability are generated at the sub-regional level. The appearance of stability at the 
level of the Kurdish region as a whole remains in so far as both parties benefit from display-
ing a common front in engagements with Baghdad and the international community over 
revenue sharing. However, the priority of each party remains at the level of sub-regional 
loyalties, meaning that the potential for conflict arises if and when one party impedes on 
9   See for instance: ‘After Iraqi Kurdistan’s Thwarted Independence Bid’, International Crisis Group, 
27 March 2019, p. 2. Available at https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/199-after-iraqi-kurdistan.pdf; 
Denise Natali, ‘The Politics of Kurdish Crude’, Middle East Policy vol. XIX, no. 1 (Spring 2012); Alex 
Dziadosz, ‘The Economic Case Against an Independent Kurdistan: The costs will be large and exacting’, 
The Atlantic, 26 September 2017. Available at https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/
kurdistan-barzani-iraq-turkey-blockade-oil/541149/; Kawa Hassan, ‘Kurdistan’s Politicized Society Con-
fronts a Sultanistic System’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (August 2015). Available at 
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_54_Hassan_11.pdf; Nesreen Barwari, ‘Understanding the 
Political Economy of the KRI: The way forward toward better governance’, LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 
24 April 2018. Available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/04/24/understanding-the-political-econo-
my-of-the-kri-the-way-forward-toward-better-governance/; Djene Bajalan and Bilal Wahab, ‘Escaping 
the Rentier Model: Reforms in Iraq and the KRI’, Centre for Development and Natural Resources/AUIS, 
January 2016. Available at https://auis.edu.krd/sites/default/files/CDNR%20report%202016.pdf; Bilal 
Wahab, ‘Oil Federalism In Iraq: Resource Curse, Patronage Networks, And Stability’, PhD dissertation, 
George Mason University, 2015. Available at http://mars.gmu.edu/handle/1920/9682; Nyaz Najmalddin 
Noori, ‘The failure of economic reform in the Kurdistan region of Iraq (1921–2015): The vicious circle 
of uncivic traditions, resource curse, and centralization’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies vol. 45, 
no. 2 (2018); Sardar Aziz, ‘The Economic System(s) of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’, in Gulistan Gurbey, 
Sabine Hofmann and Ferhad Ibrahim Serder (eds), Between State and Non-State: Politics and Soceity in 
Kurdistan, Iraq and Palestine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 103–23; Ari Mamsahe, ‘Kurdis-
tan’s Democratic Developments Amid a Rentier Oil Economy’, in Anwar Anaid and Emel Elif Tugdar 
(eds), Iraqi Kurdistan’s Statehood Aspirations: A Political Economy Approach (Zurich: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2019), pp. 99–124; Piotr Sonsnowiski, ‘Rentier Economy of the Kurdish Region in Iraq as a Source of Bar-
riers for Regional Security Sector Reform’, Security and Defense Quarterly vol. 23, no. 1 (2019).
10   Mac Skelton and Zmkan Ali Saleem, ‘Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries After ISIS: Heterogeneous 
Actors Vying For Influence’, LSE Middle East Centre Report, February 2019. Available at http://eprints.lse.
ac.uk/100100/; Zmkan Ali Saleem and Mac Skelton, ‘Mosul And Basra After The Protests: The Roots Of 
Government Failure & Popular Discontent’, IRIS Working Paper, 2019. Available at https://auis.edu.krd/
iris/sites/default/files/Saleem%2C%20Skelton%20-%20Oct%202019.pdf
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the capacity of the other to maintain its patronage networks. The party always comes first. 
This party-based patronage system is partly reliant upon oil, but the recent plummeting 
of oil revenues does not necessarily pose an existential challenge to its perpetuation. Both 
parties’ networks and structures of patronage are decades old, forcefully administered, 
and well-equipped to absorb economic shocks. Even with a slashing of salaries between 
2014 and 2017 due to a precipitous fall in oil prices, the two sets of patronage networks 
largely held together. Sources of political finances and funding are diverse, including rev-
enues from border crossings, private businesses and commercial deals. Both the KDP and 
PUK have cultivated control over their respective areas through patronage from the very 
inception of the KRG in 1991 – long before oil became a key resource in filling party or 
government coffers. As the historical section of the paper will show, Iraqi Kurdistan is not 
best conceptualised through the lens of oil-based rentierism. 
In the forthcoming sections, we focus on the structure, funding and evolving operations 
of two-party patronage. In order to demonstrate the remarkable durability of this system, 
we show how the revenue sources that enable the distribution of jobs and services have 
shifted dramatically between 1991 and the present while the core operations of patron-
age have remained the same. We will also look at how the parties have built not only 
vast networks of patronage across the population but also well-equipped and well-trained 
security forces. The paper concludes by providing an assessment of the stability of the 
KRG in the light of recent regional and national developments.
The Structure of Patronage
Patronage in the KRI is a nearly totalising system divided along party lines. Though the 
KRG administration is formally unified, in practice the two parties control appointments 
across the ministries and local governmental bodies. It is almost impossible to obtain 
a senior post in the government outside the party apparatus and hierarchy.11 At the top 
levels, the predominant majority of significant positions within the KRG administrations 
(e.g., ministers, vice ministers, advisors, director generals) are political appointees of the 
PUK and the KDP, requiring the blessing of politburo members or other top party officials.12 
Rebeen Fatah, an Erbil-based journalist, noted: ‘Payroll has been the primary mechanism 
11   Employment in the public sector has largely depended on one’s ability to obtain party recommenda-
tion/approval (written letters from PUK/KDP party offices) and wasta (the personal support of a key 
figure within the two major parties). A recent example is the case of employing 100 people in the KRG’s 
Raparin Administration based on the PUK’s recommendation: ‘Raparin Administration: Based on Party 
Recommendation, the PUK Employs 100 people’, KNNC, 8 February 2019. Available at https://www.
knnc.net/Details.aspx?jimare=13512
12   These top level government officials are selected and appointed by the two parties’ leading organs 
and figures. Individuals are appointed based on their loyalties to the parties and the parties’ influential 
leaders: Interviews with KRI-based journalists, academics, and former members of the Gorran move-
ment, KRI, August 2019–January 2020. See also Kawa Jabary and Anil Hira, ‘The Kurdish Mirage: A 
Success Story In Doubt’, Middle East Policy vol. XX, no. 2 (2013), pp. 107–8. 
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through which the ruling elite in the Kurdish region have bought off people’s loyalties.’13 
This party loyalty is cultivated both at the individual and group level. A set of high-level 
appointments may be directed towards buying the allegiances of certain powerful tribes, 
societal groups and localities. 
Employment through one party apparatus or the other amounts to a political gag order. 
Since the inception of the Kurdish autonomous region in 1991, those who have received 
their jobs through the PUK and the KDP have been expected to refrain from expressing 
support for the opposite party, particularly in the security branches and other sensitive 
institutions such as the airports.14 After 2003, this gained greater significance with the 
introduction of regular elections, as each party’s network of government employees was 
expected to vote for its respective patron. When a significant faction of PUK appoin-
tees expressed support for Gorran between 2009 and 2013, hundreds were punished 
by the party leadership. Some were dismissed and others were forcibly moved to other 
departments.15 Now that Gorran has essentially been sidelined, the party is symbolically 
granted a handful of senior positions in the KRG administration. These appointees are 
given very little leeway and have effectively become absorbed within the KDP and PUK’s 
patronage system.16
The two parties also strictly control employment in the party organs and economic firms. 
The PUK and the KDP own dozens of media organisations, party-affiliated NGOs, youth 
clubs and companies. It is extremely difficult for any large business to operate without 
direct partnerships with party companies and proxies.17 Party members openly admit 
this. A KDP-affiliated official stated: ‘The leadership of the KDP and the PUK paved the 
way for their close relatives and party members to engage in businesses’.18 A number of 
the party-affiliated businesses have become multi-billion dollar operations, generating 
employment and revenue for party affiliates on a scale that rivals some of the major public 
sector institutions.19 
In the construction and transportation industry, both the KDP-controlled KAR company 
13   Interview with Rebeen Fatah, an Erbil-based journalist, Erbil, 25 August 2019.
14   Jabary and Hira, ‘The Kurdish Mirage’.
15   Interview with a member of the Gorran Movement, Sulaimani, 20 December 2019. Shorsh Haji, a 
leading figure within the Gorran Movement, stated in May 2019 that the PUK was still practicing polit-
ical punishment against members of the security forces that support and vote for his movement. Diyar 
Aziz, ‘Gorran: PUK continues in practicing political punishment and we will not hold bilateral meeting 
with it’, Basnews, May 2019. Available at http://www.basnews.com/so/babat/518908 
16   Interview with Muhammed Rauf, KRI-based journalist, Sulaimani, 29 May 2020. See also Zmkan Ali 
Saleem and Mac Skelton, ‘Protests and Power: Lessons from Iraqi Kurdistan’s Opposition movement’, 
LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 10 November 2019. Available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/11/10/pro-
tests-and-power-lessons-from-iraqi-kurdistans-opposition-movement/
17   Interview with a KDP government official in Erbil, 20 August 2019. 
18   Interview with Fursat Sofi, a former KDP-affiliated MP and Erbil’s current governor, Erbil, 22 August 
2019. 
19   Interviews with KRI-based journalists, academics and members of the PUK and the KDP, KRI, August 
2019–January 2020.
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and the PUK-controlled Qaiwan Group have become enormously profitable firms.20 Party 
companies monopolise construction and transportation across the region, and they own 
large factories (producing cement and iron) and refineries.21  Sarkawt Shamsaddin, an 
independent Kurdish MP in Baghdad, claims that Qaiwan and KAR are active in southern 
Iraq and have signed multi-million dollar contracts with Iraq’s federal ministries, such 
as electricity and oil.22 In addition to these party-controlled companies, the PUK and the 
KDP have ensured that nearly all government contracts and projects are awarded to their 
affiliate firms, particularly in their respective subregional zones.23
Importantly, affiliation with one party or another does not mean the owners of the above 
companies have no freedom to generate revenues towards their own personal wealth. On 
the contrary, a key part of the incentive structure ensuring the durability of the marriage 
between party and private sector is the promise of personal enrichment. The top leader-
ship of such companies are granted space to reap rewards for themselves and the party.24
Another pillar of the patronage system is the targeted provision of services and employ-
ment across the population. In the years following the 2003 invasion, improvements in 
services largely benefited core areas of party support.25 This favouritism26 led to protests 
in Halabja in 200627 and then across the Kurdistan region in 2011.28 To contain the popular 
discontent, both parties made joint efforts to allocate greater resources towards infrastruc-
ture (such as roads, overpasses, bridges, schools and hospitals); housing and marriage 
mortgages; scholarships for studying abroad; water and electricity; increased salaries and 
lands for state employees,29 and job opportunities in the civilian institutions of the KRG.30 
20   Sarkawt Shamsaddin, ‘What do the PUK and KDP want from Baghdad?’, Speemedia, 20 May 2020. 
Available at http://www.speemedia.com/drejaWtar.aspx?NusarID=572&Jmare=7158 
21   The KRI has two relatively large refineries. Kalak is operated by KAR Group and has a capacity of 
100,000 bpd with a near-term planned increase to 185,000 bpd by 2018. Bazian is operated by Qaiwan 
Group and has a capacity of 34,000 bpd with plans to increase to 100,000 bpd by 2018. Robin Mills, 
‘Under the Mountains: Kurdish Oil and Regional Politics’, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January 
2016, p. 24. Available at https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Kurd-
ish-Oil-and-Regional-Politics-WPM-63.pdf
22   Shamsaddin, ‘What do the PUK and KDP want from Baghdad?’.
23   Interview with an Erbil-based academic, Erbil, 17 July 2019.
24   Interviews with KRI-based businessmen, KRI, August 2019–January 2020. 
25   Andrea Fischer-Tahir, ‘Representation of Peripheral Space in Iraqi Kurdistan’, Études rurales [Enligne] 
no. 186 (2013), pp. 117–32. 
26   Lydia Khalil, ‘Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality Or Mirage?’, The Saban Centre for Middle East 
Policy at The Brookings Institution, June 2009. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/06_kurdistan_khalil.pdf  
27   ‘Halabja Protests Turns Violent’, Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 20 March 2006. Available at 
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/halabja-protest-turns-violent
28   Zanko Ahmed, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan: 2011, a year of demonstration and political debate’, Niqash, 20 Decem-
ber 2011. Available at https://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/2962/ 
29   Denise Natali, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’s Silent Revolution’, Al-Monitor, 16 August 2013. Available at https://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/iraqi-kurdistan-silent-revolution-barzani.html
30   Interview with Muhammed Rauf, KRI-based journalist, Sulaimani, 29 May 2020.
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The Funding of Patronage
How are these networks of patronage funded? In addition to revenues from border cross-
ings, party-run businesses, and commercial deals, at present the vast extension of services 
and employment across the population relies heavily on oil revenues.31 Not only has the 
region received billions from the annual Baghdad allocation to the KRG,32 the leadership 
of the two parties has also aggressively developed production independent of the federal 
government.33 Independent oil exploration and production requires a degree of collusion 
and cooperation between the two parties under the banner of the KRG Ministry of Natural 
Resources. However tenuous and fragile this cooperation may be, both parties are mutu-
ally invested in the success of local oil production, and thus the sector is usually a source 
of stability between the two and their respective subregions. 
This policy of independent oil production has been pursued despite strong opposition 
from successive federal administrations in Baghdad for two primary reasons: first, local 
production was justified on the basis of guaranteeing regional economic survival in the 
event that Baghdad decided again to marginalise the Kurds.34 The KDP and the PUK 
sought to demonstrate to the Kurdish community that they, and not the federal govern-
ment, provided salaries and funds for development. The oil and gas sector itself became a 
major generator of employment. The PUK and the KDP monopolised businesses around 
the sector, granting security and service provision jobs to party-affiliated companies and/
or entities acting as proxies for the parties. Employees working in the KRG oil sector  were 
vetted by the security agencies of the two parties, ensuring that party members and affili-
ates obtained jobs and benefits from the sector.35 
31   The most recent data on the KRG’s payroll numbers shows that the government has 1,255,273 employ-
ees of which 752,959 (60%) are on duty and 502,346 (40%) are retired. Available at http://drawmedia.net/
page_detail?smart-id=5991
32   Denise Natali, ‘The Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Stabilizer or Spoiler?’, Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs vol. 14, no. 2 (2013), p. 73; Ahmed Tabaqchali, ‘The debate over Iraqi Kurdistan’s share of the 
federal budget’, Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies, 2019, p. 7. Available at http://www.bayancenter.
org/en/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/9876544.pdf 
33    Mills, ‘Under the Mountains’; John Roberts, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan Oil And Gas Outlook’, Atlantic Council/
Global Energy Centre and Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Centre, September 2016. Available at https://www.atlan-
ticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/iraqi-kurdistan-oil-and-gas-outlook/; International 
Crisis Group, ‘Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds’, Middle East Report no. 80 
(October 2008). Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/01/0170B88601AA571A-
56580F04A4D0CB22_80_oil_for_soil___toward_a_grand_bargain_on_iraq_and_the_kurds.pdf; Yaniv 
Voller, ‘Kurdish Oil Politics in Iraq: Contested Sovereignty And Unilateralism’, Middle East Policy vol. 
XX, no. 1 (2013).
34   International Crisis Group, ‘Oil For Soil’, pp. 23–4. 
35   Interview with a political science professor at Salahaddin University, Erbil, 25 July 2019. 
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Second, the off-the-books nature of local production36 served to conceal the overall 
revenues of the parties. Only a few key people, including Ashti Hawrami, Nechervan 
Barzani, Masrour and Masoud Barzani have full knowledge around the details of the 
oil production and revenues.37 Sherko Jawdat, a Kurdish MP affiliated with the Islamic 
Union party, contends that the KRG and its Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) have 
so far refused to provide the Kurdish parliament with clear information about the 
region’s oil sales and revenues.38
The parties’ current reliance upon oil revenues to fund patronage networks and there-
fore buy the support of the population would appear to indicate a rentier state structure.39 
However, the sources of revenue in the Kurdistan Region have not been consistent over 
time. And yet, the region has witnessed a remarkable level of continuity in the struc-
ture, logic, and operations of patronage. The following section will interrogate the nexus 
between patronage and revenue, arguing that the two-party apparatus has effectively 
ensured the survival of the system by continually expanding into new sources of income. 
Oil is important as a revenue source; however, it cannot be said that oil uniquely structures 
the system. The two parties manage to perpetuate patronage regardless of the sources of 
revenue streams. 
Patronage beyond Oil: Revenues between 1991 and the Present 
This patronage system emerged at the very inception of Iraqi Kurdistan as an autonomous 
region. While both the KDP and PUK had been in existence as active political parties 
with separate military forces for decades, the 1991 establishment of a no-fly zone and an 
autonomous Kurdish region provided the opportunity to establish formal structures of 
governance and security over the population. 
1991–6: Revenues from Smuggling and Border Crossings
The governing institutions that soon took shape in 1992 (e.g., the Kurdish National 
Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the judiciary system) were never given space to 
become independent of the party apparatuses. All major decisions were made by top party 
members while the various governmental bodies operated as rubber stamps for imple-
36   Patrick Osgood, ‘Selective Transparency: Things You Can’t See About KRG Oil’, LSE Middle East 
Centre Blog, 25 April 2018. Available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/04/25/selective-transparency-
things-you-cant-see-about-krg-oil/
37   Interview with Sherko Jawdat, an MP affiliated with the Islamic Union party, Sulaimani, 29 December 
2019. 
38   Ibid. 
39   A rentier state is typically defined as a state that gains a ‘substantial portion of its income from exter-
nal sources, most generally from the sales of resources such as oil and gas’. Donald L. Losman, ‘The 
Rentier State And National Companies: An Economic And Political Perspective’, Middle East Journal vol. 
64, no. 3 (2010), p. 428. Available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40783108.pdf
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menting KDP and PUK agendas.40 The structure of the government reflected the structure 
of the two parties. As we described in a previous report, a quota-based system (party 
muhassasa) distributed posts between the two parties’ faithful.41 If a ministerial position 
was granted to a KDP affiliate, a PUK member was assigned as his deputy, and vice versa.42 
All positions operated according to this logic. As David McDowall stated: ‘The parallel 
administration reached down to police in the streets and teachers in schools.’43 Accord-
ingly, residents of the Kurdish Region had no choice but to join one of the parties. 
McDowall added: ‘Joining one of the parties became an essential prerequisite to advance-
ment – nepotism was disastrously entrenched in the fledging administration undermining 
any chance of democratic institutional growth.’44 With the establishment of the new gov-
ernment, two-party patronage was born. 
At this juncture, these nascent patronage networks were primarily reliant on revenues 
from smuggling and border crossings. During the 1990s, the region became a major transit 
and smuggling route, with numerous products including oil from the provinces under the 
former Ba’ath regime passing through Erbil and Dohuk towards Turkey, and vice versa.45 
While these revenues were significant, the patronage system quickly broke down due to 
scarcity. Cut off from Baghdad’s budget and under international sanctions, neither party 
had the funds to deliver essential services and provide large numbers of government jobs.46 
In this context, the PUK sensed an imbalance, alleging that that the KDP was not dis-
closing all revenues, particularly from the border crossing with Turkey.47 PUK forces then 
waged war, removing the KDP from Erbil in 1995 and asserting military dominance over 
the extended region.48 The Kurdish civil war (1994–6) was at its root a conflict over the 
revenues undergirding patronage. And this fierce conflict transpired long before oil pro-
duction became central to the region’s economic life. 
40   Michiel Leezenberg, ‘Politics, Economy, and Ideology in Iraqi Kurdistan since 2003: Enduring Trends 
and Novel Challenges’, Arab Studies Journal vol. 23, no. 1 (2015), pp. 157–9. 
41   Zmkan Ali Saleem and Mac Skelton, ‘The Kurdish Duopoly: The Political Economy of Two-Party 
Rule’, LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 28 August 2019. Available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2019/08/28/
the-kurdish-duopoly-the-political-economy-of-two-party-rule/
42   Gareth R. V. Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emerging Democracy (London & New 
York: Routledge/Curzon, 2003), p. 146
43   David McDowall, A Modern History Of The Kurds (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004) p. 386. 
44   Ibid. 
45   Michiel Leezenberg, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan: Contours of a post-civil war society’, Third World Quarterly vol. 
26, no. 4–5 (2005), pp. 631–47
46   John Robert, ‘The Kurdish Crisis of 1996’, IRBU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Autumn 1996, pp. 70–5.
47   Saleem and Skelton, ‘The Kurdish Duopoly’. 
48   Ibid.
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When the KDP was finally able to regain control of Erbil with the help of Saddam’s forces 
in 1996,49 two different governments emerged – one in Sulaimani and another in Erbil.50 
The political configuration would remain up through the invasion of 2003. Despite the 
fact that neither government was capable of ensuring reliable services to the populace, 
their popularity was not meaningfully threatened. Extreme poverty gave Kurds no choice 
but to latch onto one of the two major political parties – the only institutions in the region 
with any measure of consolidated resources.51 This was a patronage system founded upon 
a relationship based on deprivation.
1996–2003: International Aid and the Oil For Food Program (OFFP)
Between 1996 and 2003, the Kurdish region benefited from both international aid, dis-
tributed through international non-governmental organisations52 and the OFFP, which 
injected money and resources into the region and both parties. (The KRG received 13 
percent of the total budget.)53 The implementation of the programme was controlled 
by the UN but it benefited the PUK and the KDP through the profitable contracts for 
local distribution and infrastructure projects that were involved with implementing the 
programme.54 As Michiel Leezenberg observed, ‘[t]hrough the new contracting business 
the two parties further consolidated their positions in the territories under their military 
control, even though the allocation of resources was not strictly in their hands but in 
those of the UN officials and even the Iraqi regime.’55
The region witnessed gradual stabilisation. The incentives for business outweighed what-
ever gains could be obtained through violence. The two parties extended their patronage 
networks, even directing salaries and resources to nascent opposition groups.56 The 
groundwork was now laid for the two parties to receive and administer the enormous 
influx of cash that would come with the 2003 invasion.
49   Richard Parry and John Lichfield, ‘Saddam attack leads to Arbil bloodbath’, The Independent, 3 
September 1996. Available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/saddam-attack-leads-to-ar-
bil-bloodbath-1361551.html
50   Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, p. 155. 
51   Leezenberg, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’, p. 640.
52   Michiel Leezenberg, ‘Humanitarian Aid in Iraqi Kurdistan’, Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée ori-
entale et le monde turco-iranien / Fondation nationale des science politiques, Centre d’études et de recherches 
internationales, January 2000. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/30445358_Human-
itarian_Aid_in_Iraqi_Kurdistan
53   Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, p. 55.
54   Yaniv Voller, ‘From Rebellion to de facto Statehood: International and transnational sources of 
the transformation of the Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq into the Kurdistan Regional 
Government’, PhD thesis, LSE, 2012, p. 173. Available at http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/474/1/Voller_From%20
rebellion%20to%20de%20facto%20statehood.pdf
55   Leezenberg, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan’, p. 639.
56   Ibid.
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2003–14: External Support, Federal Petrodollars and Local Oil Production
In 2003, the Kurdish region witnessed considerable injection of external support provided 
by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) from US aid and Iraq’s oil revenues. This went 
directly to the PUK and the KDP-controlled administrations in the Kurdish region (in con-
trast to the previous practices of INGOs, the UN and foreign governments which refrained 
from directly working with the KRG).57 The 2005 constitution cemented this economic 
relationship between centre and periphery, with the Kurdish region receiving 17 percent 
of the total federal oil revenues.58 The display of Kurdish unity during this period must be 
understood through the prism of the emerging post-2003 distribution of resources.59 
Cooperation between the two parties was also necessary in the joint pursuit of local oil 
production. Gradually, however, this move tipped the balance of power in favor of the 
KDP. In 2006, the PUK and the KDP agreed to create a unified ministry that would control 
the oil sector across the region. The ministry ultimately came under the control of the 
KDP, particularly in the hands of Nechirvan Barzani and his Minister of Natural Resources 
Ashti Hawrami – considered the mastermind of the KRG’s oil policy.60 The KDP has his-
torically enjoyed closer security/economic cooperation with Turkey, allowing the KRG to 
export oil across the border independent of Baghdad, particularly after the completion 
of the KRG-Ceyhan pipeline.61 The PUK begrudgingly ceded this ground in exchange for 
an even split of the revenues. Not only did this arrangement place the entire technical 
apparatus of the oil industry in the KDP’s hands, it also enabled the Barzanis to make 
essentially unilateral decisions around oil sales and exports without PUK input.62   
2014–Present: Turmoil in Revenue Sources and Distribution
The oil revenue crisis of 2014 placed unprecedented stress on the Kurdish political-eco-
nomic order. With the KRG-Turkey pipeline finally completed in 2013, the KDP quickly 
moved to initiate exports to Turkey,63 justifying its actions in the vagueness of consti-
tutional frameworks around regionalism and oil. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s 
response was swift, cutting the region off from its 17 percent allotment of federal reve-
57   Denise Natali, The Kurdish Quasi State (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010), pp. 81–2. 
58   Ibid. 
59   Jude, ‘Contesting Borders?’, p. 849.
60   Carlo Frappi, ‘The Energy Factor: Oil and State building in Iraqi Kurdistan’, in Stefano M. Torelli (ed.), 
Kurdistan: An Invisible Nation (Milan: ISPI, 2016), pp. 91–120, p. 101. 
61   Mohammed A. Salih, ‘Low Oil Prices Complicate Iraqi Kurdish Independence’, Middle East Institute, 
March 2016. Available at https://www.mei.edu/publications/low-oil-prices-complicate-iraqi-kurdish-in-
dependence
62   Interview with Sherko Jawdat, an MP affiliated with the Islamic Union party, Sulaimani, 29 December 
2019. 
63   Volkan Ozdemir and Slawomir Raszewski, ‘State And Substate Oil Trade: The Turkey-KRG Deal’, 
Middle East Policy vol. XXIII, no. 1 (Spring 2016).
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nues.64 Simultaneously, an abrupt drop in global petroleum prices slashed the anticipated 
earnings from oil exports. By 2015, the KRG was unable to pay salaries. By April of the 
same year, the region was $17 billion in debt, forcing the government to borrow massive-
ly.65 The revenue from Baghdad had accounted for 80 percent of the KRG’s budget.66 The 
disastrous fallout of the independence referendum further threatened revenue sources. 
Some analysts speculated that the duopoly would not survive these pressures.67
These judgments were understandable, but premature. As in the period of scarcity during 
the 1990s, the two parties remained the only game in town. No other political entity was 
capable of extending contracts, benefits and cash. In addition to considerable pressure 
from the international community, the election of May 2018 created incentives for Iraqi 
Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to restore the salaries of KRG employees in the hopes 
of entering the vote with all major crises settled.68 With the money flowing again, both 
parties regrouped and reinjected new funds into patronage networks.69 Ultimately the 
parties proved stronger than the revenue sources upon which they rely. 
No matter how large the disparity in revenues, neither party can ultimately annihilate the 
other. This is largely due to the two parties’ separate control of security forces over dis-
tinct territorial areas. Even with the PUK in a relatively weak position at present, the KDP 
forces cannot enter PUK areas without permission, and vice versa. Importantly, the mili-
tary and security forces of the two parties both protect the key revenues sources flowing 
into patronage networks (e.g., mobilising around oil and gas fields) and generate patron-
age networks of their own through the mass extension of well-compensated employment. 
And thus the patronage system in Kurdistan cannot adequately be understood without a 
close examination of the two parties’ peshmerga armed forces and other security branches.
64   Mark DeWeaver, ‘Kurdistan’s Great Recession: From Boom to Bust in the Rentier Economy’, IRIS 
Report, 1 December 2015. Available at http://www.iraq-jccme.jp/pdf/archives/kurdistans-great-reces-
sion-0308.pdf 
65   Mills, ‘Under the Mountains’.
66   Ibid. 
67   Erica Solomon, ‘Iraqi Kurdistan Faces Economic Fallout From Independence Vote’, Financial Times, 
28 September 2017. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/0d592a0a-a388-11e7-9e4f-7f5e6a7c98a2; 
‘Kurdistan Region’s Debt Crisis Threatens Iraq’s Economy’, USIP, 9 May 2018. Available at https://www.
usip.org/publications/2018/05/kurdistan-regions-debt-crisis-threatens-iraqs-economy 
68   Saleem and Skelton, ‘The Kurdish Duopoly’.
69   Ibid.
Zmkan Ali Saleem and Mac Skelton 19 
Patronage in the Security Branches
With the emergence of the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in 1991 came the need to 
formalise local government institutions, including those related to security. The Ministry 
of Peshmerga was formalised in 1992 after the region’s first elections.70 All the PUK and 
KDP militia groups who had been fighting the Iraqi government were now placed under 
the formal jurisdiction of the ministry. But quickly it became apparent that this ministry 
had little control over the various PUK and KDP-backed militias, each of which followed 
party leaders and party commanders rather than the ministry leadership.71 As a reflection 
of this impotency, the ministry was soon disbanded with the outbreak of the Kurdish Civil 
War in 1994. This caused the deaths of 3,000 to 5,000 fighters and civilians and the further 
deprivation of a population starved by the UN sanctions period.72 The dissolution of the 
ministry was effectively sealed following the war when both parties – who remained bit-
terly divided – established entirely separate ministries of peshmerga with corresponding 
training facilities and bases. Thereafter, the peshmergas of the PUK and the KDP were 
trained, paid and equipped by their own parties.73 The two peshmergas operated as sep-
arate forces and, consequently, separate patronage networks. Soldiers looked to their 
parties for salaries, provisions and orders.
In the years following the 2003 invasion, unification of the two forces transpired in name 
only. To date, the routes of entry into the security forces – and particularly the officer 
ranks – are mediated through party channels.74 Commanders accept new recruits based on 
written recommendations of party functionaries at the branch level, and thus the recruit 
owes his job and salary both to the political and military wings of the party.75 Maintaining 
fighters’ loyalty simultaneously to the commander and the party is key to securing the 
popular electoral base. Thousands of peshmerga and security forces vote for their respec-
tive parties during regional and national elections.76 The size and political significance of 
this population of soldiers cannot be underestimated. Prior to 1991, the numbers of the 
peshmerga under the control of the PUK and the KDP did not exceed 15,000 to 25,000 
70   Dennis P. Champan, ‘Security Forces Of The Kurdistan Regional Government’, USA WC Civilian 
Research Project, 2009, pp. 98–9. Available at https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a510826.pdf
71   Wladimir Van Wilgenburg and Mario Fumerton, ‘Kurdistan’s Political Armies: The Challenge Of 
Unifying The Peshmerga Forces’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 16 December 2015. Available at https://
carnegieendowment.org/2015/12/16/kurdistan-s-political-armies-challenge-of-unifying-peshmer-
ga-forces-pub-61917
72   Champan,‘Security Forces Of The Kurdistan Regional Government’, p. 99. 
73   Interviews with advisors at the Ministry of Peshmerga, Sulaimani/Erbil, August–December 2019. 
74   Dana Taib Menmi, ‘Peshmerga unity depends on healing political divisions’, Al-Monitor, 3 December 
2019. Available at https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/12/iraq-protests-peshmerga-kurdis-
tan.html 
75   Interviews with officials within the Ministry of Peshmerga, Erbil/Sulaimani, August– December 2019.
76   Interview with Mahmood Haji Omer, a former MP working on peshmerga affairs at the Kurdish par-
liament, Sulaimani, 20 December 2019. 
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fighters respectively.77 Now, however, the KDP is in control of approximately 100,000 
peshmerga while the PUK is in control of 90–95,000, and even this huge number excludes 
the numerous other security formations.78
The levels of control over individual soldiers remain in place over the course of one’s 
career. The Ministry of Peshmerga distributes salaries to the PUK and the KDP forces 
based on numbers and lists provided by local commanders. This reporting system grants 
the commanders, and therefore the parties, with enormous leverage over their fighters.79 
Rank and file soldiers and officers within the peshmerga are well-paid and are often enti-
tled to other privileges, including allocation of lands and access to party resources.80 The 
continuation of such rewards is conditional. In some cases, a failure to vote for the PUK 
or KDP in elections has resulted in a cessation of salaries, the outright loss of one’s job or 
transfer to an undesirable unit. This fate befell many peshmerga who voted for the Gorran 
party,81 but has transpired less often now that Gorran has become co-opted within the two 
party system.82 
Placing salary distribution in the hands of field commanders presents a potential danger 
to overall party discipline as it creates a strong patronage relationship between the com-
mander and the soldier, and gives these commanders access to the means for personal 
enrichment through party resources. Indeed, commanders have reported exaggerated 
numbers of the forces under their control.83 A commander might have 200 soldiers but 
report almost triple that number to the ministry, which in turn distributes salaries to the 
unit based on the commander’s report. Fursta Sofi, previously an MP but now the gover-
nor of Erbil, stated: ‘One of the most serious corruption issue we face is the problem of 
ghost employees, particularly in the armed forces. This is difficult to solve because of the 
nature of the security institutions. Hundreds of military ranks were given out and salaries 
were increased purely based on nepotism and party affiliation.’84
Further, both the PUK and KDP rewarded thousands of their members and supporters 
with government salaries by registering them as retired military staff members, even 
though some of these have never served in the Peshmerga and military forces. Abu Bakri 
77   Champan, ‘Security Forces Of The Kurdistan Regional Government’.
78   Phone interview with Qadir Watman, a former MP working in the Kurdish parliament’s Peshmerga 
Affairs Committee, 15 October 2019. 
79   Interview with Mahmood Haji Omer, a former MP working on peshmerga affairs at the Kurdish parlia-
ment, Sulaimani, 20 December 2019. See also Verena Gruber, ‘Revisiting Civil-Military-Relations Theory: 
The Case of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq’, Small Wars Journal, 2015. Available at: https://
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/revisiting-civil-military-relations-theory-the-case-of-the-kurdistan-re-
gional-government-of
80   Interview with Mahmood Haji Omer, a former MP working on peshmerga affairs at the Kurdish par-
liament.
81   Ibid.
82   Zmkan Ali Saleem and Mac Skelton, ‘Protest and Power: Lessons from Iraqi Kurdistan’s Opposi-
tion Movement’, LSE Middle East Centre Blog, 10 November 2019. Available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
mec/2019/11/10/protests-and-power-lessons-from-iraqi-kurdistans-opposition-movement/ 
83   Gruber, ‘Revisiting Civil-Military-Relations Theory’.
84   Interview with Fursat Sofi, an MP when interviewed but now Erbil’s governor, Erbil, 22 August 2019.
Zmkan Ali Saleem and Mac Skelton 21 
Haladni, a Kurdish MP, asserted: ‘150,000 people receive military retirement salaries, and 
some have been retired with high military ranks, and so they receive large salaries. But 
there were never any more than 10,000 active peshmergas at the height of our campaigns 
against the former regime, so it doesn’t add up.’85 While this problem is widely recognised 
by both parties, attempts towards reform could prove very difficult. Commanders insist 
that any such reforms would inhibit their ability to maintain control over their forces.86And 
the top party leaders ultimately stand to gain from the layered patronage system, as the 
looseness of the distribution mechanism provides ample opportunity for kickbacks both 
down and up the hierarchy.
In the end, both commanders and foot soldiers know that their access to salaries and 
privileges is dependent upon their continued loyalty to the party apparatus. This is not to 
say that notions of Kurdish nationalism or protection of the homeland are irrelevant in 
motivating mobilisation. But such ideological and discursive factors have too often been 
overemphasised in relation to the peshmerga. Ultimately the fact remains that security 
jobs are among the most stable and high-paying available in the Kurdish region, and there 
is no means of accessing these posts without tethering one’s career to both the political 
and military wings of the KDP or PUK.
Looking Ahead: Assessing Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan 
The stability of the KRG largely depends on continuing co-operation between the PUK 
and the KDP. The fact that the two parties share power and resources through the KRG 
administration has encouraged relative stability in the Kurdish region as a whole. But the 
recent change in the PUK leadership has put greater pressure on the informal elite pact 
between the two parties. The PUK’s January 2020 party conference settled the controversy 
over who would fill the position of the party’s top leader after the death of Jalal Talabani 
in 2017, resulting in Bafel Talabani and Lahur Sheikh Jangi becoming the co-leaders.87 The 
two figures are believed to have successfully brought the PUK’s key organs, security forces 
and finances under their control.88
The KDP views the internal shifting balance of power within the PUK with great concern 
and the party has so far refused to meet the co-leaders of the PUK.89 Masoud and Masrour 
Barzani, the top leaders of the KDP, are deeply distrustful of Bafel and Lahur and previ-
ously accused them of treason for allegedly striking a deal with the Iraqi government to 
85   ‘Haladni: 30,000 women have been retired with military ranks’, Bmctv.net, 1 March 2020. Available at 
https://www.bmctv.net/Detail.aspx?jimare=9981 
86   Gruber, ‘Revisiting Civil-Military-Relations Theory’.
87   ‘Bafel Talabani and Lahur Sheikh Jangi elected as PUK’s co-leaders’, Nasnews.com, 18 February 2020. 
Available at https://nasnews.com/kurd/view.php?cat=9487
88   Phone interview with a Sulaimani-based political observer. 
89   Rebwar Kareem Walli, ‘KDP on the back of the PUK, and the latter on the back of fish’, Rudaw, 10 
February 2020. Available at https://www.rudaw.net/sorani/opinion/10022020
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withdraw PUK forces in Kirkuk after the Kurdish referendum of September 2017.90
Despite the fact that the PUK is formally part of the coalition government in Erbil, in 
reality the co-leaders of the PUK are uneasy with the KDP’s dominance in the Kurdish 
region. The PUK has publicly criticised the KDP for not honouring its agreement in ‘dis-
tributing government positions and levers of power’.91 But the PUK has limited resources 
and capacity at their disposal to exert pressure on the Erbil-based party. Starting in 2012 
with Jalal Talabani’s illness and removal from the political scene, the PUK lost much of 
its cohesiveness due to internal rivalry and defections.92 The PUK’s series of strategic 
miscalculations allowed the internally coherent KDP to further consolidate its control 
of the KRG, strengthening dominance over the oil and gas infrastructure and funds 
from Baghdad.
Recent political and security events need to be understood in this context. In April 2020, 
for the first time since the end of the civil war in 1998, the Kurdish region witnessed a mili-
tary standoff between peshmerga forces controlled by the PUK and the KDP at Zini Warte, 
an area located at the demarcation line that separates the military zones of PUK-KDP 
control near Erbil.93 The KRG’s Prime Minister Masrour Barzani ordered forces from the 
Ministry of Peshmerga’s shared PUK/KDP brigades to Zini Warte, ostensibly to enforce 
the COVID-19-related lockdown in the area. The PUK saw the action as a KDP encroach-
ment to what the party called a part of the ‘PUK’s traditional areas of military control’ and 
responded by sending their peshmerga forces.94 Given the tensions between the powerful 
factions within the two parties, such a military standoff could pose serious threats to the 
stability of the region. 
The Sulaimani governorate’s recent demands for greater financial and administrative powers 
from the Erbil-based KRG has raised the prospect of decentralisation within the KRG. Lack 
of or slow infrastructure development in Sulaimani compared to Erbil has lowered the 
PUK’s popular appeal. Supporters of decentralisation argue that Sulaimani could ensure 
greater access to revenues from oil and gas production and international border crossings.95 
These calls for decentralisation have also been encouraged by PUK’s co-leaders as a way of 
challenging the KDP’s dominance over the KRG’s government institutions and revenues.96 
The KDP leadership argues that demands for decentralisation reflects the desire of ‘certain 
90   Hemin Salih, ‘After October 16, Kirkuk’s security, politics and economy are under threat’, Basnews.
com, 16 October 2018. Available at http://www.basnews.com/so/babat/473267
91   ‘PUK spokesperson’s press conference’, KNN, May 2019. Available at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=zAaP5v8eweM
92   Mohammed Salih, ‘The New Politics of Iraqi Kurdistan’, Washington Institute, 16 August 2020. Avail-
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94   Dri, ‘What is behind the armed Kurdish party standoff in Zini Warte?’.
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figures’ within the PUK (clearly referring to the PUK’s co-leaders) who seek to break up the 
KRG and return to the days of two separate administrations in the Kurdish region.97
Overt clashes over oil revenues are on the rise. In March 2017, the PUK sent security 
forces to occupy Kirkuk’s northern oil company and disrupt production at two oilfields 
under the control of the KDP.98 In February 2020, competition over the distribution of 
liquefied petroleum gas contracts resulted in a shortage of gas in Erbil and Duhok.99 The 
crisis emerged when the KDP-controlled Ministry of Natural Resources decided to ter-
minate a contract with a PUK-affiliated company around Kor Mor gas field in Sulaimani. 
Both parties publicly exchanged harsh accusations and blame for the resulting shortages.100 
Potentially exacerbating PUK/KDP tensions further, the KRG is currently facing its worst 
financial crisis since 2003, which has been caused by plummeting oil prices (related to 
COVID-19) and Baghdad’s recent decision to stop sending the KRG its share of the federal 
budget. The KRG will struggle to pay employees’ salaries. Protests have already taken place 
in the city of Duhok,101 one of the KDP’s main support bases. It is likely that the KRG will 
reach a new budget sharing agreement with Baghdad based on ongoing negotiations with 
Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s government. But no matter how the negotiations turn out, the KRG, 
and by extension the KDP and PUK, will face huge budget shortfalls. 
How reduced salaries and the budget will impact PUK/KDP relations remains to be seen. 
In the post-2003 era, the economic benefits of maintaining a veneer of Kurdish political 
unity (in negotiations with the international community and Baghdad) have far out-
weighed the potential gains that could be made through a return to violent inter-party 
conflict. This collusion between the two parties, however fraught, has significantly con-
tributed to the overall stability of the Kurdish region between 2003 and the present. But 
rising inter-party tensions are a reminder that cooperation between the KDP and PUK is 
not to be taken for granted. As long as the party-based patronage system remains firmly in 
place, the interests of each individual party will ultimately come before that of the region 
as a whole, meaning that conflict always remains a possibility. The recent military standoff 
in Zini Warte may not be the last such incident. 
97   ‘KDP MP: they want to use political mechanism to continue the path of October 2017 treason’, 
Basnews.com, 5 May 2020. Available at http://www.basnews.com/so/babat/601518
98   ‘Kurdish forces occupy oil facility in Kirkuk, provoking Iraqi government’, Middle East Eye, 2 March 
2017. Available at https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/kurdish-forces-occupy-oil-facility-kirkuk-pro-
voking-iraqi-government
99   Dri, ‘As financial crisis looms, Sulaimani renews call for devolution’.
100   ‘Gas crisis in Erbil: KDP can’t provide services for the population, PUK official says’, Ekurd.net, 4 
February 2020. Available at https://ekurd.net/gas-crisis-in-erbil-kdp-2020-02-04
101   Belkis Wille, ‘Kurdish Authorities Clamp Down Ahead of Protests’, Human Rights Watch, 19 May 2020. 
Available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/19/kurdish-authorities-clamp-down-ahead-protests
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Policy Implications and Recommendations
A robust long-term governance strategy – formulated and executed with international 
oversight – is required to reduce the dominance of party-based patronage. Some analysts 
have argued that the recent drops in oil revenue related to COVID-19 will place unique 
pressure on the KRG to implement economic and anti-corruption reforms,102 but this 
outlook is ahistorical. Previous dips in oil prices and overall economic scarcity have never 
succeeded in shifting the structural dominance of party-based patronage in Iraqi Kurdis-
tan. When scarcity becomes acute and the flow of cash into the patronage system stalls, 
the parties have generally been capable of weathering the storm, as both rank and file 
employees and people in senior posts know that ultimately the KDP and PUK are the only 
game in town in terms of access to jobs and resources. In short, drops in oil prices do not 
change the rules of the game. Iraqi Kurdistan is not best understood through the lens of 
oil-based rentierism. When one looks to the historical development of patronage in the 
Kurdish region, one finds that the sources of revenue have not been consistent over time. 
And yet, the region has witnessed a remarkable level of continuity in the structure, logic 
and operations of patronage. 
In sum, economic upheaval will not naturally lead to meaningful reforms in the absence 
of significant diplomatic pressure. The international community has the most potential 
leverage over the Kurdish parties due to decades of consistent financial and diplomatic 
support. As locals often say, however, this support has too often been granted ‘for free’ – 
i.e. without sufficient conditionality. In light of this leverage, the following measures are 
recommended to the international community: 
(1) Encourage transparency in key financial and resource institutions 
Lack of transparency in revenues from oil sales, local taxation, and border cross-
ings is feeding PUK/KDP patronage networks and eroding popular trust in the KRG. 
Accountability and transparency are particularly important for the ministries of 
finance and natural resources. Similarly, introducing robust independent oversight at 
the KRG-controlled border crossings and other key points of state revenue generation 
would improve public confidence in government. 
(2) Understand that both the public and private sectors are implicated in the 
patronage system
So much of the US/UK/EU economic doctrine in relation to Kurdistan specifically 
and Iraq generally has focused on the importance of diversifying the economy and 
expanding the private sector, moving emphasis away from the bloated public sector. 
This paper has shown that two-party patronage is deeply intertwined with the private 
sector through party-controlled firms as well as rents. Pushing diversification without 
102   Biner Azis, ‘Emerging Risks and Reforms: The KRG’s Challenges in Building a Post-Coronavirus 
Economy’, Washington Institute, 2020. Available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/
view/KRG-KRI-Economy-Corruption-Reforms-COVID19 
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addressing corruption in the private sector will ultimately only serve to fill party 
coffers. The international community should work with the KRG to set a long-term 
business environment and anti-corruption strategy, creating operational and invest-
ment space for companies not owned or influenced by the parties.
(3) Encourage public sector salary reform initiatives currently underway
Recently the Kurdish parliament approved a reform package that aims to address 
the issue of ghost employees in the security and civilian institutions.103 Some have 
already cast doubt on the potential for widespread implementation (beyond superfi-
cial window dressing) because these reforms would target the two parties’ patronage 
networks. Members of the international community should encourage these steps, 
applying pressure to ensure that the removal of ghost employees is carried out com-
prehensively and not according to party quotas. 
(4) Reconsider the status quo approach to support for Kurdish security forces
It is time for the US, UK, Germany and France to apply greater pressure on the PUK/
KDP to loosen financial and tactical control over the Peshmerga as well as the security 
forces controlled by the Ministry of Interior, introducing a comprehensive package of 
reforms that eliminate party-controlled approvals of new recruits and meaningfully 
place both recruitment and operational command under the KRG Ministries of Pesh-
merga and Interior. This package of reforms must be coupled with close oversight 
from the international community. 
(5) Work with and empower civil society organisations and independent media
Currently, the two dominant parties own and control the largest media outlets and 
NGOs. The PUK and the KDP have been able to co-opt independent journalists and 
civil society organisations and have thus secured an environment where they face very 
little criticism. This dynamic is not encouraging accountability and transparency in 
the region, and has been detrimental to the Kurdish region’s democratic development. 
Providing greater assistance to independent media and civil society organisations 
could ensure that the ever-narrowing space for free expression – and criticism of the 
two-party patronage system – is protected. 
103   Mohammed Rauf and Fazil Hama-Rafa’at, ‘What do you know about the reform project?’, Drawmedia, 
8 August 2019. Available at http://drawmedia.net/page_detail?smart-id=4312
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